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Towards t he Kecognition of Same-Sex
Partners in European Union Law:




IN THE FINAL third of the last Century (i.e. smce the 1960s), an mcrease m thelegal recogmtion of homosexuahty could be seen in almost all European coun-
tnes. Four trends appear to be charactenstic of this process of legal recogmtion
at the national level (i) steady progress, (n) Standard sequences, (m) small
change, and (iv) symbohc preparation. The purpose of this chapter is to assess
how these trends might also operate at the supranational level of the European
Union. The assumption is that a comparative analysis of national legislation
may provide useful guidance about what recogniuon of same sex partners to
expect (and to demand) from the legislative bodies of the European
Community—and when.
COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
Foi thirty-six membei states of the Council of Europe, I have summansed the
process of legal lecogmtion of homosexuahty by hstmg (in the Appendix, Tables
l and 2, pp. 649-50) the years of the main legislative Steps m that piocess. The
structure of both tables is based on my perception of the trends of steady progress
and of Standard sequences (see below). The idea is that almost all (European)
countnes go, at different times and paces, through a Standard sequence of steps
recogmsing homosexuahty. After decrimmahsation (followed or accompamed by
an equahsation of the ages of consent), more or less specific anti-discnmination
1 LL M , Ph D , Senior Lecturer, E M Meijers Institute of Legal Studies, Faculty of Law,
UmverMteit Leiden, c waaldi]k@law leidenumv nl, http //ruljis leidenuniv nl/user/cwaaldij/www/
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legislation will be enacted, to be followed by legislation mstitutionahsmg same-
sex partnership (and parenthood).2
Table l ranks the fifteen member states of the European Union accordmg to
the number of steps they have taken m their legislation, and accordmg to how
long ago a particular country legislated its last step. Table 2 gives a rankmg,
based on the same cntena, of twenty-one other member states of the Council of
Europe. By presentmg these two groups of countnes separately, it becomes evi-
dent that the pattern of legal reform among EU countnes is similar to that
among non-EU countnes.
Both tables are of course a gross simplification. Judicial, administrative, local
and non-governmental forms of (legal) recognition have not been incorporated.
In the two columns on cnmmal law, no distmction has been made between laws
only applymg to sex between men, and laws also applymg to sex between
women. Earher penods of equahty in crimmal law have not been taken mto
account.3 Legislative recognition of unregistered same-sex cohabitation (eg
Hungary) is absent from this overview, äs are the possibilities for same-sex cou-
ples to have jomt authonty over the children of one of the partners (eg United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Iceland).
FOUR TRENDS
The four trends charactenstic of the process of legislative recognition of differ-
ent aspects of same-sex love, can be witnessed in so many (European) countnes
that it is temptmg to formulate them äs "laws". In the absence of falsification
so far, I will indeed speculatively formulate the third and fourth trends äs
"laws".4 The notable exceptions to the first two trends, however, prevent me
from phrasmg them äs general truths.
The Trend of Steady Progress
Since the 1960s, almost all European countnes have made some legislative
progress m the legal recognition of homosexuahty. The tables in the Appendix
show four exceptions to this trend of steady progress. In Greece, the last round
of progressive legislation relating to homosexuahty took place a httle earher (in
1950). And the other three exceptions (Turkey, Italy and Poland) happen to be
2 K Waakh)k, "Standard Sequences m the Legal Recognition of Homosexuahty—Europe's Fast,
Present and Future", (1994) 4 Australastan Gay and Lesbtan Law Journal 50, "Civil Developments
Patterns of Reform in the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partners in Europe", (2000) 17 Canadian
Journal of Family Law 61
3 The most recent example of such a penod was in Portugal from 1945 until 1995 See
H Graupner, Sexualttaet, Jugendschutz und Menschenrechte, Teil 2 (Frankfurt, P Lang, 1997) at
597-8
4 I hope to challenge readers to try to falsify my hypotheses
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the three European countnes with by far the longest umnterrupted history
of füll equahty in crimmal law.5 In most countnes, one step of legislative
recognition of homosexuahty was followed some years later with one or two
other steps in the same direction.
Furthermore, smce the 1960s, hardly any country has mtroduced new anti-
homosexual legislation. Luxembourg did so in 1971 by mtroducmg a higher
mimmum age for homosexual sex,6 and Portugal did it (madvertently) in 1995
by mtroducmg a lower mimmum age for heterosexual sex.7 The only other
example that I know of is the (meffective) British law of 1988 prohibitmg local
authonties from "promotmg" homosexuahty.8
The Trend of Standard Sequences
A Standard sequence may be seen m the typical order of the changes m those
countnes that do make progress. Legislative recognition of homosexuahty Starts
(most probably after some form of association of homosexuals and Information
on homosexuahty has become legal) with (1) decriminahsation, followed or
sometimes accompamed by the settmg of an equal age of consent, after which
(2) anti-discnmmation legislation can be mtroduced, before the process is
fimshed with (3) legislation recogmsing same-sex partnership and parenting.
This trend is quite strong, both inside and outside the European Union. This can
be seen m Tables l and 2 in the Appendix
• In only thirteen of the thirty-six countnes was the decriminahsation of homo-
sexual acts accompamed by the settmg of an equal age of consent.9 In most
countnes, the step of decriminahsation was (or will have to be) followed by a
later step of equahsmg the age hmits.
• With the exceptions of Ireland and Finland, all countnes that have so far
enacted anti-discrimmation provisions, had decrimmahsed homosexual activ-
ity and had estabhshed equal ages of consent at least three years before.10
Furthermore, only four of the twelve countnes with equal ages of consent for
5 Tuikey and Italy lead in this way (with 143 and 112 years respectively) Poland (with 69 years}
is also fai ahead of countnes hke the Netherlands and Norway
6 From 1971 until 1992, the mmimum age for sex between women or between men was eighteen,
wheieas the heterosexual age hmit was fourteen, smce 1992, it has been sixteen for all See
Graupner, supra n 3, at 531
7 In 1995, the mimmum age for heteiosexual sex was lowered from sixteen to fourteen, whereas
the homosexual age limit was left at sixteen, Graupner, supra n 3, at 597-8
8 Local Government Act 1988, s 28 (now only England and Wales, repealed for Scotland m
2000)
9 However, in five of these countnes (Netheilands, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and
Portugal), different age hmits were mtroduced many years after the initial decriminahsation
10 Finland equahsed its age hmits three years after the mtroduction of spccific anti-discnmmation
legislation
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more than a decade, have so far not enacted anti-discnmmation provisions
Belgmm, Poland, Italy and Turkey.
• All twelve countnes with some form of national or regional registered
partnership legislation in force or in preparation have already equahsed their
ages of consent m cnmmal law. And ten of them also have in force national
constitutional or legislative anti-discnmination provisions intended to cover
sexual onentation. The two apparent exceptions are Belgmm and Germany
(but see p. 767, and note the provisions m four German Lander). Furthermore,
only three of the thirteen countnes with such anti-discnmination provisions
do not have some form of national or regional registered partnership legis-
lation in force or in preparation Ireland, Luxembourg and Slovema.
The "Law of Small Change"
A "law of small change" can be formulated to capture the fact that legislative
change on homosexuality is seldom big, legislation advancmg the recogmtion and
acceptance of homosexuality only gets enacted if it is perceived äs a small change
to the law, or if it is sufficiently reduced in impact by some accompanymg
legislative "small change" that remforces the condemnation of homosexuality.11
The "Law of Symbohc Preparation"
Fmally, I would submit, the process is governed by a "law of symbohc prepara-
tion". A legal System that has been oppressmg homosexuality, will only move to
legislation that actually protects and supports lesbian women and gay men,
after first passing some symbohc legislation reducmg the condemnation of
homosexuality (e.g. by advancmg its acceptance). The mam examples of the
workmg of this law are decnminahsation (which seldom is more than the repeal
of cnmmal rules that were hardly ever apphed, because almost all forbidden acts
take place in private, or because the authorities had already decided to no longer
prosecute under these rules) and anti-discnmmation legislation (which mostly
consists of rules that are hardly ever apphed, because the forbidden grounds
often remain undetected and unprovable in the mmd of the discrimmator, or
because the victims of the discrimmation frequently have good reasons not to
Start proceedmgs).
This is not to say that crimmal and anti-discrimmation provisions do not
have any practical effects. in certam individual cases they will be used, and they
will serve generally to deter or justify certam behaviour. It seems that only after
decnmmalisation and anti-discrimmation legislation have been enacted, will
national law-makers pass legislation that is of more direct practical importance
to the hves of greater numbers of lesbian women, gay men and their children.
1 ' For illustrations of this "law" at work m the Netherlands, see Waaldijk, chap 23
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The primary importance of the intermediäre symbolic legislation may well lie in
its paving the way for such practical legislation on partnership and parenting.
Jurisdictions (and their judges, legislators, and electorates) seem to need time to
get used to the idea that homosexuality is neither a crime, nor a good reason for
refusing employment or housing.
PREDICTING DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW
I will now try to use these four trends and "laws" to predict the process of legal
recognition of homosexuality, and especially same-sex partnership, in the
European Union äs such.
Steady Progress in the European Union
If most EU countries are making progress in the legal recognition of homosexu-
ality, then it may be assumed that the EU äs such will make similar steady
progress. Furthermore, the European Parliament repeatedly,12 the Commission
and Council occasionally,13 and the collective of member states once,14 have
given some evidence that homosexuality is slowly getting more favourable
treatment in EC law. All this is not surprising, given the fact that the EU is
becoming very much like a European state. The most recent example is Article
21 (Non-discrimination) of the (non-binding) Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union (the "EU Charter"): "Any discrimination based on any
ground such äs sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, language, genetic
12 See eg "Resolution on sexual discrimination at the workplace", Official Journal (OJ) [1984] C
104/46; "Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC", OJ [1994] C 61/40
(calls on the Commission to draft a Recommendation seeking to end "the barring of lesbians and
homosexual couples from marriage or from an equivalent legal framework" and guaranteeing "the
füll rights and benefits of marriage, allowing the registration of partnerships"); "Resolution
on respect for human rights in the European Union (1998-1999)", 16 March 2000, A5-0050/00,
http://www.europarl.eu.int/plenary/default_en.htm ("57. . . . calls on the Member States . . . to
amend their legislation recognising registered partnerships of persons of the same sex and assigning
them the same rights and obligations äs exist for registered partnerships between men and women;
. . . to amend their legislation to grant legal recognition of extramarital cohabitation, irrespective of
gcnder; . . . rapid progress should be made with mutual recognition of the different legally recog-
nised non-marital modes of cohabitation and legal marriages between persons of the same sex in the
EU"). See also p. 725, n. 70.
" Notably by including anti-homosexual harassment in the notion of sexual harassment in the
non-binding "Commission Recommendation of 27 Nov. 1991 on the protection of the dignity of
women and men at work", endorsed by a Council Dcclaration of 19 Dec. 1991 (OJ [1992] L 49/1, C
27/01). See A Byrne, "Equality and Non-Discrimination" in "Waaldijk & Clapham (eds.),
Homosexuality: A European Community Issue (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 211
at 214—5; M Bell, "Equal Rights and EU Policies", in K Krickler (ed.), After Amsterdam: Sexual
Orientation and the European Union (Brüssels, ILGA-Europe, 1999) at 30—1, http://www.ilga-
europe.org (Policy Documents). See also infra n.24.
14 By including the ground of "sexual oricntation" in the new Art. 13 of the EC Treaty, which
empowers the Council to combat discrimination on various grounds.
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features, political or other opinion, rehgion or belief, membership of a national
mmonty, property, birth, disabihty, age or sexual onentatton shall be prohib-
ited".15 Just hke other European states, the EU is gradually recognising homo-
sexuahty m law.
Following the Standard Sequence?
If the EU then may be followmg the trend of steady progress, the expectation
should be that it will also follow the Standard sequence. Here, the problem is
that the EU äs such has no history of anti-homosexual crimmal law, because
cnminal law has generally been a competence of the member states. So for the
first Steps, we have to look at the individual member states. All have decnmi-
nahsed. Eleven have equahsed their ages of consent. Four member states still
have unequal age hmits,16 and at least one of them, Austna, is still actively usmg
the higher age hmit for gay sex to imprison people.17 This may not be a total bar
to any anti-discnmmation or indeed partnership legislation by the EC, after all,
Ireland and Fmland have shown that anti-discnmination legislation may be
enacted before füll equahty in crimmal law has been reached.18 Furthermore,
the age hmit discnmmation m the crimmal law of two countnes is hmited (to
oral and manual sex in Ireland and to seduction in Greece), and m Portugal the
age hmit for gay sex is not higher than it is for heterosexual sex m most other
countnes.19
Hopefully, a future rulmg of the European Court of Human Rights will estab-
hsh that age hmits in crimmal law must not discrimmate on the basis of sexual
onentation. Such a rulmg (most hkely in a future case agamst Austna)20 would
probably result in a further reduction of the number of member states with dis-
cnminatory age hmits. And that in turn would help to pave the way for more
comprehensive anti-discnmination measures being unammously adopted by the
Council of the EU.
With a majonty of the member states having national anti-discnmination
legislation covermg sexual onentation by 1997,21 the time had come for the
15 Solemn Proclamation, signed by the Presidents of the European Parharaent, the Council, and
the Commission m Nice on 7 Dec 2000, OJ [2000] C 364/1 (eraphasis added)
'6 See App , Table l
17 See H Graupner, "Austna", in D West & R Green (eds), Soctolegal Control of
Homosexuality A Multi-Natton Companson (New York, Plenum Press, 1997) 269 at 273
18 See p 637
19 See App , Table l
20 In Sutherland v VK (No 25186/94), the Emopean Commission of Human Rights has already
reached this lonclusion (Repoit of l July 1997, http //www echi coe mt/hudoc) That the European
Court of Human Rights will follow the Commission seems hkely, givcn three cases recently decided by
the Court Smith O1 Grady v UK and Lustig Prean O1 Beckett v ÜK(27Sept 1999), Salgueiro da Suva
Mouta v Portugal (21 Dec 1999), A D T v UK (31 July 2000) Thrce challenges to an unequal age
hmit, S L v Austna (No 45330/99), G L v Austna (No 39392/98), and A V v Austna (No 39829/
98), wcre commumcated by the Court to the respondent on 30 Jan 2001 See Giaupner, chap 30
21 See App , Table l
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adoption of EC rules outlawing at least certam forms of discrimmation. These
could be based on the new Article 13 in the EC Treaty (added in October 1997
and m force smce May 1999), which enables the Council (actmg unanimously)
to prohibit discrimmation on eight grounds, includmg sexual onentation.22 The
Commission did not waste much time m preparmg some Implementation of
Article 13 on 25 November 1999, it presented a "Proposal for a Council direc-
tive estabhshmg a general framework for equal treatment in employment and
occupation",23 which would prohibit employment discrimmation on all Article
13 EC grounds (includmg sexual onentation, but excludmg sex, already covered
by other duectives). The proposal made swift progress and was adopted by the
Council on 27 November 2000.24
This new "Framework Directive" could (together with the no doubt growmg
number of countnes with some sort of same-sex partnership legislation) greatly
help to prepare the ground for later EC legislation recognismg same-sex part-
nership, m such diverse fields äs freedom of movement or the EC staff regula-
tions. The Directive could also provide the much needed extra justification for
the Court of Justice to Interpret the numerous references m EC law to "spouses"
m a less traditional way.25 One of the key dynamics of the Standard sequence
seems to be, that once a junsdiction has prohibited others (e.g. employers) from
distinguishing on the basis of sexual onentation, the legislature and judiciary
will have to ask themselves whether it is justifiable that the law itself contmues
to distmguish on the same, now suspect ground.26
Small Change in the EU
That the EU m this field is followmg the "law ofsmall change" is only too evi-
dent. The first mention of homosexuahty in a legal anti-discrimmation docu-
ment can be found m the explanatory part of the non-bmdmg "Commission
Recommendation of 27 November 1991 on the protection of the dignity of
22 See M Bell, "The New Aiticle 13 EC Tieaty A Sound Basis for Euiopean Anti-Disciimmation
Law'", (1999) 6 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparatwe Law 5, L Flynn, "The
Implications of Aiticle 13 EC—Aftei Amsterdam, Will Some Forms of Disciimmation Be More
Equal than Othets'", (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 1127 See also Knckler, supra n 13
" COM (1999) 565, OJ [2000] C 177 E/42 See Bell, chap 37
24 Council Dir 2000/78/ECof 27Nov 2000 estabhshmg a general framewoik for equal trcatraent
m employment and occupation, OJ [2000] L 303/16 Two grounds (racial 01 ethnie ongin) were
deleted because they were covered by a separate directive See mfra n 33
25 At the very least, any distmction between married hcterosexual spouses and homosexual reg
isteied paitneis should be classified äs a distmetion based on sexual onentation The first chance for
the Court of Justice to uüe on this point came when it had to decide D v Council, Cases C 122/99
P, C 125/99 P (appcals from a 28 Jan 1999 decision of the Court of First Instance m Case T-274/97,
m his Opmion of 22 Feb 2001, Advocate General Mischo urged the Court of Justice to dismiss the
appcals, the Court of Justice agiecd in its Judgment of 31 May 2001, see Conclusion, pp 767-69)
See also Bell, chap 37, L Flynn, "Equahty between Men and Women m the Court of Justice", m
Eeckhout & Tndimas (cds ), (1998) 18 Yearbook of European Law 259 at 285-26
'ö See Waaldijk (2000), supta n 2, at 85
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women and men at work".27 What followed were facilmes for same-sex part-
ners of European Parliament staff to use restaurants and language courses.28
And the new anti-discnmmation clause in the Staff Regulation does mdeed
mclude the ground of sexual onentation.29 However, the clause renders itself
virtually meanmgless with regard to the partners of gay and lesbian staff by pro-
vidmg that distmctions based on mantal Status are unaffected.30
These small changes mdicate that it is more than probable that EC legislation
protectmg or supportmg lesbian women and gay men will take relatively short
Steps, reflectmg the caution or prejudice of perhaps only a few of the many mdi-
viduals and countnes involved in producmg EC rules. The new Article 13 of the
EC Treaty itself, although pohtically important, is already an example of that
it is only an enablmg clause, it has no direct effect, it can only be implemented
by a unanimous Council, and the ground of sexual onentation is not accompa-
nied by that of civil Status.31 Similarly, Article 21 of the new EU Charter is not
bmdmg.
Of the first two directives adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 13
EC, only the Framework Directive deals with sexual orientation discnmmation,
and that directive only covers the field of employment.'2 That restnction is in
sharp contrast with the much wider directive prohibiting racial discnmmation
in employment, social secunty, healthcare, education, and the provision of
goods and Services, includmg housmg (the "Race Directive").33 And the poten-
tial impact of the Framework Directive may be further reduced by the following
pieces of "small change"
• As to the ground sexual onentation, the Commission's explanatory memo-
randum claims that "a clear dividmg hne should be drawn between sexual ori-
entation, which is covered by this proposal, and sexual behaviour, which is
not".34 This is of course a nonsensical claim. no such dividmg hne can be
made, because in most cases of anti-homosexual discnmination, the differ-
ence of treatment is based on the sexual onentation of certain behaviour.
Hardly anyone will be denied employment because he or she has had sex (or
lives) with another person, nor because of his or her unexpiessed sexual
preferences the denial of employment will far more offen bc based on the
sexual onentation of the sexual activity or on the sexual onentation of the
27 See supra n 13
28 On25Feb 2000, a similar measure was adopted at the Court ofjustice non pecuniary spousal
benefits arc now available to unmarned (same-sex or different sex) partners of employees of the
Court A more generous scheme, mcludmg pecuniary benefits such äs pension cntitlements, was
adopted on 17 Äug 1995 at the European Monctary Institute m Fiankfuit, and subsequently at the
European Central Bank
Council Regulation 781/98 of 7 April 1998, OJ [1998] L 113/4, Alt la
0 See Bell, supra n 13, at 31
See supra n 22
See supra n 24
Council Dir 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the pnnciple of equal treatment
betwccn persons irrcspective of lacial 01 ethnic oiigm, OJ [2000] L 180/22, Art 3
34 Supra n 23, para 5a tA i t l
Towards the Recognition of Same-Sex Partners in EU Law 643
cohabitation, i.e. on the fact that the person's behaviour was oriented towards
someone of the same sex.35 Nevertheless, the Statement in the explanatory
memorandum could be (wrongly) interpreted (at the national level) äs imply-
ing that employers will be allowed to continue discrimination against practis-
ing homosexuals. Fortunately, the Court of Justice does not use explanatory
memoranda when interpreting directives.
• The explanatory memorandum also claims that "this proposal does not affect
marital Status and therefore it does not impinge upon entitlements to benefits
for married couples".36 Preambular paragraph 22 repeats this claim: "This
Directive is without prejudice to national laws on marital Status and the
benefits dependent thereon." This claim is in direct contradiction to the pro-
posed prohibition of indirect discrimination. It is evident, in the words of
Article 2(2) of the Directive, that the "apparently neutral" criterion of marital
Status "puts ... at a particular disadvantage" gay and lesbian couples, because
they are barred from marriage. Of course, neither the explanatory memoran-
dum nor the preamble can introduce an exception to the operative part of the
Directive. Nevertheless, these Statements could be (wrongly) interpreted äs
implying that employers will be allowed to continue the most common form
of indirect anti-homosexual discrimination—even if there is no objective
justification for it.
• Article 4(2) of the Directive allows for an exception for "public or private
organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief". Under certain
conditions such organisations would then be permitted to base a difference of
treatment on "a person's religion or belief" (but not another ground),37 and
"to require individuals working with them to act in good faith and with loy-
alty to the organisation's ethos." Applying the "loyalty to the ethos" require-
ment, certain religious organisations could claim to have the freedom to
continue discriminating against lesbians and gay men.
These three, dangerously vague, potential restrictions of the proposed prohibi-
tion of sexual orientation discrimination in employment seem to have been
politically necessary to achieve the unanimous adoption of the directive äs a
whole.
" In view of Grant v. South-West Trains, Case C-249/96, [1998] European Court Reports 1-621,
it will be difficult to deny that to discnminate between same-sex and different-sex partners is indeed
sexual orientation discrimination. Under the Dutch General Equal Treatment Act, the main prob-
lems of anti-homosexual discrimination are in fact related to the non-availability for same-sex cou-
ples of marital Status and marital advantages: since 1994, two-thirds of the more than thirty-five
"homosexual cases" brought beforc the Equal Treatment Commission have been about such part-
ner-discrimination. See http://ruljis.leidenuniv.nl/user/cwaaldij/www/ (overview in Dutch).
36 Supra n.23, para. 5 at Art. 1.
17 The Commission's original proposal permitted discrimination based on a "relevant character-
istic related to religion or behef", which seemed capable of being interpreted äs covering sexual ori-
entation. Ibid., para. 5 at Art. 4.
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Symbolic Preparation for Further Reforms in EU Law
As far äs the "law of symbolic preparation" is concerned, the question must be
whether the EU can properly be called a legal System that has been oppressing
homosexuahty. I thmk it can. Firstly, the EU is mamly the continuation, m a
growmg number of fields, of national legal Systems that have oppressed homo-
sexuahty in many ways, and that are only slowly replacmg the oppression with
some recogmtion. Secondly, the directives and regulations of the EC are füll of
references to "marnage" and "spouse", thus excluding all homosexual partners
from vanous advantages m many fields, especially that of free movement.38 In a
sense, the EC has its own—very traditional and therefore exclusively heterosex-
ual—farmly law. Therefore, it may well be necessary to get some symbolic
preparation enacted, before this legal System is up to the task of replacmg its
oppression with recogmtion.
As mentioned above, some such symbolic legislation has already been enacted
m the context of the EC. Article 13 of the EC Treaty "stands out äs conspicu-
ously and dehberately neutered".39 Nevertheless, the process of adoptmg the
text of Article 13, includmg the words "sexual onentation", may have served to
get the member states used to the idea that m the context of the EC they will
occasionally have to address the nghts of lesbian women and gay men. Thus,
Article 13 "which at present Stands äs a rhetoncal gesture may unexpectedly
give additional content to the concept of (European) citizenship".40 The rather
hmited Framework Directive on employment discnmination, and the non-bmd-
mg Article 21 of the EU Charter, will serve äs further symbolic legislation,
prepanng the field for more practically relevant laws. For example, it remams to
be seen whether enough pohtical power can be mobihsed to make the
Framework Directive äs strong äs the Race Directive, and whether the
Framework Directive will (some day) be interpreted äs prohibitmg indirect dis-
cnmmation via the so-called "neutral" cntenon of mantal Status.41
For the European Union itself, opemng up marnage or mtroducmg registered
partnership is not an Option, because it has no competence relatmg to civil sta-
tus m particular or farmly law m general, which is left to the member states.42
38 The Dutch Government's "Commission on the opemng up of civil marnage to persons of the
same sex" madc an mventory of EC regulations and directives explicitly refernng to "marnage" or
"spouse" In its report (Rapport Commisste mzake openstellmg van het burgerlt/k huweli/k voor
Personen van hetzelfde geslacht, The Hague, Mimstry of Justice, Oct 1997, at 34), it produced a hst
of seventecn such regulations and twenty four such directives from veiy diverse fields, includmg the
free movement of persons (notably Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC), social secunty, tax law,
employment, agnculture (mcludmg Commission Regulation 2568/91/EEC on ohve oil), fishenes
(includmg Council Dir 78/659/EEC on water quahty for fish), transport (includmg Commission Dir
91/662/EEC on the behaviour of the steenng wheel), and msurance
39 Flynn, supra n 22, at 1133
40 Ibtd,atnSl-2
41 See p 643
42 The institutions of the EU cannot provide EU citizens with a civil Status (more or less equiva-
lent to marnage) However, äs employers, the institutions of the EC could estabhsh a register of staff
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Therefore, there are three forms of partner-discnmmation which can be ehmi-
nated by—and in—EC law:
(1) discnmination between unmarned different-sex partners and unmarried
same-sex partners (direct discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion);
(2) discnmination between marned different-sex spouses and registered
same-sex partners (direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of sexual
onentation);43
(3) discnmination between married different-sex spouses and unmarried
same-sex partners (mdirect discrimination on the basis of sexual onenta-
tion).
The third form represents the biggest problem in most countries. However, if
füll equahty (in employment) between unmarried same-sex couples and married
different-sex couples remains too big a step for the Court of Justice, in inter-
pretmg the Framework Directive, then at least the other two forms of partner-
discrimination need to be included in it. Both inclusions will be only of limited
application m most member states (because they do not recognise unmarried
different-sex partners or do not have registered partnership for same-sex part-
ners), but they would be highly relevant äs symbohc preparation for adjusting
EC legislation to the existence of same-sex couples. This would lead to two prin-
ciples to be incorporated in the Interpretation of the Framework Directive:
• Princtple l (Employment). Where an employer provides spousal benefits to
the unmarried different-sex partner of an employee, this employer should pro-
vide the same benefits to the unmarried same-sex partner of an employee.
(This of course is the principle that the Court of Justice refused to adopt,
applying EC sex discrimination law, m Grant v. South-West Trains.44) This
principle would only affect employers who are both too modern to deny the
existence of heterosexual cohabitation, and too traditional to recognise gay
and lesbian cohabitation. The huge majority of employers in Europe are
who have registered their unmarned partner for the purposes of claimmg "spousal" nghts and obhg-
ations under the Staff Regulations. See chap. III.i, Commission's consultative document of 29 Nov.
2000, SEC(2000)2085/4, discussed m Egalite Newsletter, Issue 31, Winter 2001, pp. 3-4). The EC has
also entered the field of "free movement of civil Status" through Council Regulation 1347/2000/EC
of 29 May 2000 on |unsdiction and the recogmtion and enforcement of judgments in matrimomal
matters and m matters of parental responsibihty for children of both spouses.
41 A fourth form of discnmination could emerge, if any national body or an EC Institution
refused to recognise a same-sex marriage (c.g., one contracted m the Netherlands) äs equivalent to
a different-sex marriage.
44 Supra n.35. The Court misstated the issue in that case when it· "considered the position of
unmarned same-sex couples m relationship to unmarried and married opposite-sex couples, where
in fact, the only circumstance directly relevant to this case was the position of unmarried opposite-
sex and unmarried same-sex couples. Lisa Grant's claim was centred on the fact that other unmar-
ned couples en]oyed the travel concession". M Bell, "Shiftmg Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination
at the Court of Justice. From P v. S to Grant v. SWT", (1999) 5 European Law Journal 63 at 72.
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probably either more modern, or more traditional than that.45 So they would
not be bothered by this Interpretation of the Framework Directivc.46
• Prmciple 2 (Employment). Where an employer provides benefits to the mar-
ned different-sex partner of an employee, this employer should provide the
same benefits to the registered (or marned) same-sex partner of an employee.
(This of course is the issue which the Court of Justice had to address in D. v.
Council.47) This principle would only affect employers who happen to employ
persons who have already registered with (or marned) their same-sex part-
ners, e.g. in a Nordic country or the Netherlands.48 For most employers m
other countnes, it will be some time before this will be the case. However,
given the Grant judgment, it can hardly be denied that to distinguish between
different-sex marnage and same-sex registered partnership (or marnage) is
(direct) discnmmation on the basis of sexual onentation.
Then at some later stage the third principle could be added:
• Principle 3 (Employment). Where an employer provides benefits to the mar-
ned different-sex partner of an employee, this employer should provide the
same benefits to the partner of an employee who cannot marry the employee
because they are of the same sex, and cannot regtster with the employee
because there is no registered partnership legislation.
It will then be up to the employer whether or not to provide the same benefits
also to the unmarned different-sex partner of an employee who has chosen not
to marry. Alternatively, employers could be required (by European or national
law) to give equal treatment to marned and all unmarned couples (i.e. mclud-
mg different-sex cohabitants).
Once Prmciples l and 2 (and perhaps 3) have been mcorporated into the Inter-
pretation of the Framework Directive, the time will defimtely have come to start
amendmg (or re-mterpretmg) all the EC regulations and EC directives that
favour marned spouses. Because there are no EC rules that favour different-sex
cohabitees over same-sex cohabitees, it will not be necessary to first apply
Principle l to those regulations and directives. The incorporation of Principle l
into the Interpretation of the Framework Directive should make it pohtically
possible to prevent spousal benefits in EC rules from being extended to hetero-
sexual unmarned partners only.
In the absence of a move towards füll equal treatment of married and unmar-
ned partners (Principle 3), the process of amending or interpreting all those EC
45 Seepp 642^3
46 For this reason (and because Grant was only about equal pay and not about other aspects of
employment), I would disagrec with M Bell (supra n 44, at 75,79) and L Helfer ((1999) 93 American
Journal of International Law 200 at 203), who have both argued that Grant may have been lost
because the Court was asked to do too much
47 Supra n.25
48 For numbers of registered partners, see Waaldijk, chap 23, App VI
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rules could therefore cautiously start with Prmciple 2 (countermg the second
form of partner-discrimmation)
• Pnnciple 2 (All EU Law). Whereadirectweorregulationprovides for a benefit
for marned spouses, it should be mterpreted äs applymg to same-sex marned
spouses, and mterpreted or amended so äs to make that benefit available to
registered partners.
That prmciple will probably be first apphed to the staff regulations of the EC,
because there the parallel with the Framework Directive is most evident. After
that, the various dnectives and regulations m the economic field could be
adjusted.49 Obviously, such an extension of partnership rights would be more
controversial in some fields of EC law than m others. The Immigration rights of
the registered same-sex partners of EU citizens (and especially of non-EU citi-
zens) may well be the last to be recognised.50
Until Pnnciple 2 is incorporated into most EC rules, it would seem unhkely
that Pnnciple 3 would be apphed to them. Prmciple 2 is far less controversial,
because it simply reflects and respects changes in national family law, which are
taking place äs and when a member state feels ready to make a quasi-marital
civil Status available to same-sex couples. The recogmtion of same-sex regis-
tered partnerships (and marriages) in EU law would be a good mcentive for
other countries to create such a Status for their own citizens, without encroach-
mg on the competence of the Member States m the field of family law. However,
because it seems improbable, m the next ten years, that every member state will
legislate some form of partnership registration, the third prmciple will remam
necessary to guarantee füll equahty for all European citizens m same-sex rela-
tionships. So the final step in recognising same-sex partners would need to be the
mcorporation of Pnnciple 3 m all fields of EU law
• Prmciple 3 (All EU Law). Where a directwe or regulation provides for a benefit
for marned spouses, it should be mterpreted or amended so äs to make that
benefit also available to partners who cannot marry each other because
they are of the same sex, and cannot register äs partners because there is no
equivalent-to-marnage registered partnership legislation.
Obviously one way to incorporate that prmciple would be to extend the benefits
to all (same-sex and different-sex) cohabitants.
CONCLUSION RECOGNISING THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS
One of the many ways m which the European Union resembles its member states
is m its tradition of havmg numerous special rights for heterosexual couples.
49 See supra n 38
50 See K Waaldijk, "Towards Equality m the Freedom of Movement of Persons", m Knckler,
supra n 13, 40 at 46-7
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However, the EU also mirrors those member states m havmg slowly started to
legally recognise homosexuahty. The fact that four member states have not yet
fully completed the decnminahsation of homosexual activity could slow down
progress in the EU. Nevertheless, hke the majonty of member states, the EU has
started on the road of exphcit prohibition of anti-homosexual discnmmation.
An important, but largely symbohc step, was the mclusion of sexual onentation
äs a non-discnmmation ground in Article 13 of the EC Treaty. The first direc-
tive implementmg the non-discrimmation pnnciple of Article 13 with respect to
sexual onentation, the Framework Directive, is only a small step because of its
hmited scope (although it is certamly of great symbohc importance). Whether
the Directive will be interpreted by the Court of Justice äs covermg all direct and
indirect discnmmation between same-sex and different-sex partners is uncer-
tam. If not, amending directives will be necessary to extend its scope to equahty
between same-sex and different-sex cohabitants, between marned spouses and
registered partners, and eventually between marned spouses and unmarned/
unregistered same-sex partners.
Füll recognition of same-sex partners in fields other than employment seems
even further away, especially with respect to free movement of persons. It seems
hkely that here, too, the EU will follow the Standard sequence followed by the
member states: only after makmg it unlawful for (private) employers to dis-
cnminate on the basis of sexual onentation will the legislative bodies Start to
scrutmise their own products for distinctions on the same ground. Almost all
anti-homosexual discnmination contamed in EC regulations and directives
takes the form of special benefits for married spouses. It is submitted that these
numerous regulations and directives could first be extended, by Interpretation
or amendment, to cover registered (and married) same-sex partners; m other
words, the EU should first recognise any national recognition of same-sex part-
nerships. Thus, the EU would be merely reflectmg the changes that are taking
place m the family law of a growing number of member states. And then at a
later stage, a more comprehensive revision of EC regulations and directives
could become feasible: extending all spousal benefits to all partners who cannot
marry each other because they are of the same sex, and cannot register äs part-
ners because there is no equivalent-to-mamage registered partnership legisla-
tion.
APPENDIX
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN LEGISLATIVE STEPS IN THE LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
This overview is based on the hypothesis that almost all countnes go, at different times and paces,
through a Standard sequence of legislative Steps recogmsmg homosexuahty.51
Symbols Used
1993 = year m which the legislation came mto force
(1993) = hrmted or imphcitly worded legislation
[1993] = legislation applymg m part(s) of the country only
i.p. = legislation in preparation or not yet in force
Tablel EU Member States
Decnmm.ll- Equahsation Specifk anti- Registered Jomt or Civil
isation of male of age limits discrimmation partnership second- marnage



























































































Table 2 Other Council of Europe Member States70
Decrimmal- Equahsation Specific anti- Registered Jomt or Civil
isatton of male ofagehmits discrimmation partnership second- marnage
(+ female) m sex legislation legislation parent
homosexual offences adoption
acts
Iccland 193071 1992 1996 1996 200072 _
Norway 1972 1972 1981, 1998 1993 _ _
Slovema 1977 1977 1995 _ _ __
Czech Rep 1961 1990 2001 i p __ _
Switzerland 19427' 1992 (1999) 74 [(200l)],7' _ _
1858 _ _ _ _ _ _
1932 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1973 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1990 _ _ _ _
1991 __ _ _ _ _ _
1997 __ _ _ _ _ _ _
1998 _ _ _ _
i p
l p i p
__ (1997) _77 __ _

































51 See supra n.2 and pp. 637—38. A general source for the Information m this table is the Wotld
Legal Survey of the International Lesbian and Gay Association, http //www.ilga.org, äs well äs
ILGA-Europe's monthly EuroLetter, http //inet.uni2.dk/~steff/eurolet.htm. See also Graupner,
supra n.3, at 361-759, and "Sexual Consent The Cnminal Law in Europe and Overseas", (2000) 29
Archwes of Sexual Behavtor 415 (decnminalisation), R Wintemute, Sexual Onentation and Human
Rights (Oxford, Oxford Umversity Piess, 1997) at vm, xi, 265-6 (anti-discnmmation legislation)
(updated m Appendix II to this book), the othci chapters in this book (partnership and adoption)
Corrections and additions are always welcome (c.waaldijk@law leidenuniv.nl).
52 Unregistered cohabitation has received legislative recognition smce the late 1970s. See
Waaldijk, chap. 23.
53 In the prohibmon of discrimmation m Art. l of the Dutch Constitution, which entered into
force in 1983, the words "or any ground whatsoever" were addcd with the exphcit Intention of cov-
ermg discrimmation based on homoscxual onentation (see K Waaldijk, "Constitutional Protection
Agamst Discrimmation of Homosexuals", (1986/1987) 13 Journal of Homosexuality 57 at 59-60)
In 1992, "hetero- or homosexual onentation" was inserted m several anti-discnmmation provisions
of the Penal Code. In 1994, the General Equal Treatment Act came into force, covermg several
grounds mcludmg "hetero- or homosexual onentation" (see Appendix II, p. 786).
54 Anti-discrimmation legislation extcnded to cover employment discrimmation m 1996.
" Anti-discnmmation legislation extcnded to cover employment discrimmation m 1999.
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56 Legislation on unregistered cohabitation came mto force m 1988. See Ytterberg, chap. 22.
57 With the Intention of covenng sexual onentation discnmination, the word "tnoeuts" (morals,
manners, customs, ways) was msertcd m several anti-discnmmation provisions of the Penal Code
(1985) and of the Labour Code (1986). "Sexual onentation" is expected to be added in 2001. See
Appendix II, p. 784.
58 In the former German Democratic Repubhc (East Germany), homosexual acts between men
were decriminahsed in 1968, and the age limits were equahsed m 1989. In the pre-umfication Fedeial
Repubhc of Germany (West Germany), the dates were 1969 and 1994. See Graupner, supra n.3, at
407-10.
59 Anti-discnmination provisions specifically referrmg to sexual onentation have been mcluded
in the constitutions of three Lander (states) Brandenburg (1992), Thurmgia (1993) and Berlin
(1995). Anti-discnmmation legislation has bccn enacted in at least one Land Saxony-Anhalt
(1997).
so Although the formal age limits for heterosexual and homosexual acts were equahsed at the
time of decrimmalisation of homosexual acts m 1822, in practice homosexual acts with mmors con-
tinued to be penahsed until 1988 under a general provision agamst "senous scandal and indecency"
(sec Graupner, supra n.3, at 665-6).
61 The provisions on jomt adoption by unmarned different-sex and same-sex couples have been
suspcnded pending a challenge to the constitutional power of Navaria (vs. the national government)
to enact them. Sec Perez Canovas, chap. 26.
K2 Limited registered partnership legislation has so far only been enacted m four regions
Cataloma (1998), Aragon (1999), Navaria (2000) and Valencia (2001).
63 For oral and non-penetrative scx, the age hmit is higher for male homosexual acts (17) than for
heterosexual and lesbian acts (15). Smce decrimmalisation m 1993, the age hmit for male homosex-
ual anal sex and for heterosexual vaginal and anal sex is equal at 17. See Graupner, supra n.3, at 481,
487.
64 In 1989, only mcitement to hatred was prohibited. Discrimmatory dismissal became unlawful
in 1993, other employment discnmmation in 1998, and discnmination m education, housing, goods
and Services in 2000.
6' In several parts of Italy decrimmalisation of sex between men took place beforc 1889 (e.g. m
1861 in the Ncapohtan province). See Graupner, supra n.3, at 505, and F Leroy-Forgeot, Histotre
/urtdtque de l'komosexualite en Europe (Paris, Presses Umversitaires de France, 1997) at 66.
66 Decrimmalisation of most scx between two men over 21 took place in England and Wales in
1967, m Scotland m 1980 and m Northern Ircland m 1982 (see Graupner, supra n.3, at 711,727,739).
67 See supra n.3.
68 Legislation on unregistered cohabitation came mto foice in 2001. See p. 762.
69 In the case of "seduction", the age hmit for sex between men is higher (17) than for lesbian or
heterosexual scx (15). See Graupner, supra n.3, at 466.
70 Table 2 docs not include Andoira, Armema, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Liechtenstein, Macedoma
and San Marino, äs well äs three European states which have yet to jom the Council of Europe
(Belarus, Bosma-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro).
71 Graupncr (supra n.3, at 491) assumes that decrimmalisation took place m the same year äs in
Denmark (1930). From 1918 until 1944, Iceland was an mdependent Kingdom m personal umon
with the Kingdom of Denmark.
72 On 8 May 2000, the Icelandic Parhament passed an amendment allowmg a person in a regis-
tered partnership to adopt the child of his or hei registered partner. See EuroLetter, supra n.51 (No.
80, June 2000).
71 In five Swiss cantons, sex between men had been decriminahsed beforc the entering mto force
of the first national Penal Code m 1942. See Graupner, supra n.3, at 640.
74 Smcc 1999, the Swiss Constitution has mcluded "way of hfe" ("mode de me", "Lebensform",
"modo dt vita"} m the hst of giounds in its non-discnmination clause, which is intended to cover
"sexual onentation".
75 The canton of Gcncva adopted a hmited registered partnership law in 2001.
76 Executive ordmance only.
77 Hungary does have legislation on unregistered same-sex cohabitation. See Farkas, chap. 31.
